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1 FINANCIAL CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT
Goal:
- To apply Customer Due Diligence (CDD) measures (to identify/verify customers and to understand the nature and purpose of the proposed relationship);
- To maintain appropriate systems and controls for AML/CTF purposes;
- To monitor customer transactions and activities;
- To report suspicious activity, both internally and, if appropriate, externally;
- To keep appropriate records, and train staff;
- To comply with the UK financial sanctions regime.
Useful resources:
- Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended)
- Terrorism Act 2000, and the Anti-terrorism,
- Crime and Security Act 2001
- Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Schedule 7 Financial sanctions
- Money Laundering Regulations 2017,
- FCA regulated firms – the FCA Handbook
Risk ID | Process | What is the potential | What would result if this | What process do we | How will this be done? Who by and what will they be |
title or | risk? | occurred? | have in place to control | looking for? | |
description | the risk? | ||||
AML/R1 | CDD — | The customers are not | The PM does not know their | SDD accounts have a | SDD accounts are clearly marked within the system and |
Onboarding | who they say they are, | customer. | lifetime relationship limit | SDD limits are enforced on such accounts. | |
for SDD | the customer is not | and are subject to | |||
identified properly | A lack of or out of date AML / | enhanced ongoing | |||
KYC / fraud procedures leads | monitoring. | ||||
to a breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or legal | |||||
action | |||||
AML/R2 | CDD — | The customer provides | The PM does not know their | As part of the verification | When a client reaches a certain account threshold, a check |
Verification | incorrect address | customer. | process, we check | is automatically run and is reviewed by compliance | |
for EDD | information | customer’s address against | specialist. A certified third-party provider is used to access | ||
A lack of or out of date AML / | various databases from | databases to run background checks. | |||
KYC / fraud procedures leads | industry’s leading | ||||
to a breach of legislative | information provider — | Account thresholds are the following: | |||
requirements resulting in | LexisNexis Bridger | SDD account threshold: annual transaction volume up to | |||
regulatory censure or legal | |||||
action | 1000EUR | ||||
EDD account threshold: annual transaction volume up to | |||||
15.000EUR | |||||
EDD + source of funds threshold: annual transaction | |||||
volume more than 15.000EUR | |||||
AML/R3 | CDD — | The customer provides | The PM does not know their | We run image manipulation | As soon as we receive documents from the customer, we |
Verification | fraudulent/altered | customer. | tests on all documents that | run a check if documents were altered or amended using the | |
for EDD | documents | are received from the | following algorithms: | ||
A lack of or out of date AML / | customer. | ||||
KYC / fraud procedures leads | Signature Analysis | ||||
to a breach of legislative | Thumbnail Analysis | ||||
requirements resulting in | Error Level Analysis | ||||
regulatory censure or legal | JPEG Ghosts | ||||
action | Block Artifact Grid | ||||
Stamp | |||||
AML/R4 | Internal risks | PM is unable to verify | The PM does not have | The user would not be able | Such accounts are reviewed by trained compliance |
— Verification | customer | the skills, experience or | to access the majority of | specialist, extra background checks will be completed | |
for EDD | means to identify and | services and would have | |||
verify the customer | SDD limits enforced on | ||||
A lack of or out of date | their accounts. | ||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R5 | CDD — | Ongoing monitoring of | Failure to identify and | Real-time monitoring, | The essentials of system of monitoring are: |
Ongoing | Customer relationship | report suspected money | where transactions | ||
monitoring | laundering. | and/or activities can | it flags up transactions and/or activities for further | ||
Failure to keep customer | be reviewed as they | examination with an appropriate RiskID | |||
data up to date | take place or are | these reports are reviewed with 24 hours by the | |||
throughout the customer | about to take place | designated compliance officer | |||
relationship. | After the event, | appropriate action is taken on the findings of any | |||
Failure to appropriately | through some | further examination (account suspension, senior | |||
react to risk-based | independent review | management notification, risk-profile change) | |||
triggers | of the transactions | ||||
and/or activities that | |||||
a customer has | |||||
undertaken | |||||
AML/R5-1 | CDD — | Ongoing monitoring of | Changes in a customer’s | Real-time monitoring, | The essentials of system of monitoring are: |
Ongoing | Customer relationship | circumstances are not | where transactions | ||
monitoring | monitored. | and/or activities can | it flags up transactions and/or activities for further | ||
Failure to identify a | be reviewed as they | examination based on the account historical | |||
dormant account | take place or are | transaction volume | |||
reactivation and | about to take place | all users are obliged to verify the device used for | |||
unauthorised use. | account access using device fingerprinting technology | ||||
upon reactivation of dormant accounts extra checks | |||||
are being carried out, including enhanced transaction | |||||
monitoring and lower velocity limits | |||||
AML/R6 | CDD — | Customers are accepted | Potential breach of | We do not onboard clients | In order to get the full use of the account, customer must |
Onboarding | from a jurisdiction which | permission | from high-risk jurisdictions | successfully pass the account verification procedures. | |
for SDD | has not been approved | A lack of or out of date | |||
for the product | AML / KYC / fraud | Countries List.xlsx | Proof of Address documents from high-risk countries | ||
procedures leads to a | are not accepted. | ||||
breach of legislative | We limit an access from high-risk jurisdictions based | ||||
requirements resulting in | on the IP/location data. | ||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action. | |||||
AML/R7 | CDD | The customer is a | The business do not | We run a check against | Enhaced due diligence is applied to such customers |
—Screening | Politically Exposed | identify where EDD | several databases to verify | Senior management approval in necessary in order to | |
Person (PEP) | should be completed. | if the client is a PEP | interact with such person. | ||
There is no process for | PEP customers are also subject to enhanced ongoing | ||||
dealing with a PEP | monitoring of the business relation. | ||||
should they be identified | Source of wealth and source of funds which are | ||||
A lack of or out of date | involved in the business relationship or occasional | ||||
AML / KYC / fraud | transaction are verified with reference to documents; | ||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R8 | CDD — | The customer appears on | Having a customer who | Prior to onboarding a | If a customer appears on the sanction list, it would not be |
Screening | one or more of the | is on a sanctions list is in | client, we check customer | possible to set up an account with us or to use any services. | |
following Sanctions lists: | breach of the terrorist | against sanction lists | |||
financing legislation. | Customer’s account would get blocked by MLRO and senior | ||||
HMT List | A lack of or out of date | management would be notified. | |||
OFAC List | AML / KYC / fraud | ||||
EU Consolidated | procedures leads to a | ||||
List | breach of legislative | ||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
Sanctions | An existing customer | The business do not | Ongoing screening of | If a customer appears on the sanction list, all funds will be | |
Ongoing | becomes a sanctioned | identify where EDD | existing customers against | frozen and a report will be sent out to the HM Treasury and | |
Screening | individual during the | should be completed. | sanction lists | NCA for further course of actions | |
course of the | |||||
AML/R9 | relationship. | The risk in dealing with | |||
someone on the | |||||
HMT List | sanctions list is that we | ||||
OFAC List | are in breach of the | ||||
EU Consolidated | terrorist financing | ||||
List | legislation. | ||||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R10 | Sanctions | The PM does not have | A potential sanctions | Possible sanction list | Our system will highlight any possible matches and all |
screening | an effective process to | match is identified but | matches are filtered for a | cases will be reviewed by trained compliance officer. | |
analysis | analyse fuzzy matches. | not qualified or | review | Additional documentation will be requested before the | |
eliminated. | customer gets onboarded to make sure that it is a | ||||
The risk in dealing with | false-positive match. | ||||
someone on the | |||||
sanctions list is that we | |||||
are in breach of the | |||||
terrorist financing | |||||
legislation. | |||||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R11 | CDD — | The card is obtained by | The card has been | Card activation is a | All of our customers would need to activate the card |
Fraud | someone other than the | obtained fraudulently. | separate step that has to | prior to use, | |
customer | A lack of or out of date | be done by the customer | During the activation, personal information will be | ||
AML / KYC / fraud | asked and checked against our internal records. | ||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R12 | CDD | Multiple cards are | The card has been | Automated address | If the card order has the same delivery address as the other |
—Onboarding | provided to the same | obtained fraudulently. | monitoring | user already has, an application will be put on hold and sent | |
person (e.g. using | A lack of or out of date | for a review by a compliance officer. | |||
different names but living | AML / KYC / fraud | ||||
at the same address) | procedures leads to a | ||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R13 | Product | The customer has access | Increased exposure to | Card limits are signed off | In order to have increased card limits, the customer |
Construct | to higher limits than | financial crime and / or | by BIN sponsor and | would have to fully verify the account. | |
required | fraud activity related to | enforced by Processor | Unverified customers do not have an access to higher | ||
money laundering | rules. | limits | |||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R14 | Product | The customer has access | Increased exposure to | Wallet/velocity parameters | An access to higher limits is given only to the fully |
Construct | to purse parameters / | financial crime and / or | are signed off by BIN | verified accounts, based on the decision of a | |
velocity limits which are | fraud activity related to | sponsor and enforced by | compliance officer and subject to all the necessary | ||
not required | money laundering | Processor rules. | checks being carried out. | ||
A lack of or out of date | There is no option for an automatic increase of the | ||||
AML / KYC / fraud | limits. | ||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R15 | Receiving | Funds are received from | Money is received from | Third-party account top ups | Third-party deposits into the account are prohibited and |
Funds | a third party | an unverified 3rd party | are prohibited and get | would get refunded back to the sender. | |
which is then laundered | refunded back to the payer. | ||||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R16 | Receiving | We do not understand | Money is received from | Corporate accounts have | Card loads are limited to corporate loads only, with all the |
Funds | the Source of funds | an unverified 3rd party | to pass EDD in order to be | corporate accounts being fully EDD. | |
routinely loaded to the | which is then laundered | able to top up the PM | |||
card | A lack of or out of date | prefunding account. | |||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R17 | Initial Account | The source of the initial | Increased exposure to | Unusually high load would | Whenever customer is making an unusually high load, such |
Loading | load is unknown and / or | financial crime and / or | flag the account. | account does get flagged and then reviewed by the trained | |
unusually high | fraud activity related to | compliance specialist. A source of funds confirmation would | |||
money laundering | be obtained. | ||||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R18 | Transaction | PM does not | The product is used for | Automated transaction | We use the automated transaction monitoring system which |
Monitoring | identify any | fraud and / or money | monitoring | uses a variety of techniques to detect any | |
unusual or | laundering purposes | unusual/suspicious activity. Based on third party provider | |||
suspicious activity | A lack of or out of date | (GPS protect) we screen each transaction against more than | |||
on the cardholder’s | AML / KYC / fraud | 200 rules and approve/reject it in real time. | |||
account | procedures leads to a | ||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R19 | Reporting | Knowledge or | A lack of or out of date | Training and reporting | All members of the staff undergo training and must |
Suspicion | suspicion of | AML / KYC / fraud | report any suspicious activity to the compliance officer. | ||
Account | financial crime is | procedures leads to a | If necessary further reports are sent to NCA. | ||
activity | identified but not | breach of legislative | Reports are generated automatically and are reviewed | ||
reported | requirements resulting in | by the MLRO to make sure the submission is done on | |||
regulatory censure or | time. | ||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R20 | Tipping Off | Cardholder is | A lack of or out of date | Training | All members of staff are aware that |
notified that a SAR | AML / KYC / fraud | disclosing an information regarding internal or external | |||
has been submitted | procedures leads to a | report has been made is a criminal offence. | |||
(‘Tipping Off’) | breach of legislative | ||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R21 | Fraud | Unauthorised | Increased exposure to | Extensive security | Our system analyses client information during the log |
Management | persons attempt to | financial crime and / or | measures | in process, device fingerprint, IP address and location | |
access a | fraud activity related to | are checked against our records. | |||
customers account | money laundering | Customers are notified about the importance of use of | |||
A lack of or out of date | 2FA authentication in order to prevent unauthorised | ||||
AML / KYC / fraud | access to the account | ||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R22 | Lost & Stolen | The customer loses their | A lack of or out of date | Automated transaction | We use the automated transaction monitoring system |
cards | card and it is used by | AML / KYC / fraud | monitoring | which uses a variety of techniques to detect any | |
somebody else | procedures leads to a | unusual/suspicious activity and to block such cards in | |||
breach of legislative | case of the theft. | ||||
requirements resulting in | There is an option to block the card via the web | ||||
regulatory censure or | interface or on a mobile app. | ||||
legal action | 24/7 IVR line is available in case customer doesn’t | ||||
have an access to the internet. | |||||
AML/R23 | Card Delivery | The card is | The product is used for | Card activation is a | All customers would need to activate the card prior to |
intercepted on | fraud and / or money | separate step that has to | use. During the activation, personal information will be | ||
route to the | laundering purposes | be done by the customer | asked and checked against internal records. | ||
address provided | A lack of or out of date | ||||
during the on | AML / KYC / fraud | ||||
boarding stage | procedures leads to a | ||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R24 | Programme | PM doesn’t have enough | No one is looking at | Company holds a | We keep a adequate staff pipeline in order to manage the |
Management | resources to manage the | financial crime risk so | substantional reserves in | product should the amount of resources required increase | |
product | there is a large financial, | order to allocate trained | drastically. | ||
reputational and legal | compliance officers in a | ||||
risk to the business due | timely manner. | ||||
to the likelihood of this | |||||
customer being involved | |||||
in financial crime. | |||||
A lack of or out of date | |||||
AML / KYC / fraud | |||||
procedures leads to a | |||||
breach of legislative | |||||
requirements resulting in | |||||
regulatory censure or | |||||
legal action | |||||
AML/R25 | Financial | Anti-Money | Through lack of | All the compliance | All compliance officers undergo rigorous backgrounds |
Crime | Laundering / | knowledge of procedures | officers must be | checks and must obtain an internationally recognised | |
Training | Financial Crime | and legal requirements, | certified by an | certificate in order to manage the programme’s AML | |
training is not or is | staff act on client | internationally | obligations. | ||
inadequately | instructions without | recognised AML | |||
provided. | undertaking basic AML | training institution. | |||
checks. This leads to | (e.g ICA) | ||||
unrecognised money | |||||
laundering, resulting in | |||||
criminal action including | |||||
both financial penalty | |||||
and custodial | |||||
sentencing. | |||||
Furthermore, there are | |||||
potential reputational | |||||
issues due to a lack of | |||||
staff knowledge and the | |||||
likelihood of being the | |||||
victim of financial crime | |||||
AML/R26 | Record | PM does not keep | PM and Issuer in breach | All the cardholder activity is | Customer information is being stored on a remote, |
keeping | adequate records | of record keeping | logged and securely stored | IP-restricted server and being encrypted by a | |
requirements and unable | in an encrypted form in | bank-grade encryption (AES-256). | |||
to investigate and | order meet PM’s | All databased connections are secured via SSL/TLS | |||
suspicion of fraud or | recordkeeping | All the transaction are backed up in order to meet the | |||
financial crime properly | requirements. | record-keeping requirements should the production | |||
database fail. | |||||